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ABSTRACT: Besides the impact that COVID-19 has had in the sanitary, political and 
economic domains, it has also triggered multiple discursive processes, what opens 
up the field for an analysis from sociosemiotics, the social science interested in the 
study of ‘meaning in action’. The aim of this article is to discuss from such a per-
spective how the current crisis linked to the COVID-19 virus has given place to the 
emergence of processes of narrative construction of an ‘Other’ to be blamed for the 
threat. While in some contexts the dominant narrative has been that COVID-19 is ‘the 
Chinese’ –and their unhealthy culinary habits– fault, in others the focus has been set 
on ‘the irresponsible’ that do not stay home when indicated to do so, as well as on ‘the 
posh’, given that they can afford travelling and hence can import the virus on their 
return. Departing from the premise which poses that cognition is articulated in narra-
tive terms, the article argues how, in cases such as the current COVID-19 crisis, a dis-
cursive construction of collective actors by means of mechanisms of actorialization, 
generalization and axiologization is necessary for the dynamics of blame-attribution.
KEYWORDS: coronavirus, COVID-19, sociosemiotics, constructivism, blame
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SOMEBODY TO BLAME. ON THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE OTHER IN THE 
CONTEXT OF THE COVID-19 OUTBREAK
In January 2020, a virus until that moment unknown by the scientific community 
gained attention world-wide due to the speed of its propagation: the ‘novel coronavi-
rus’, popularly known simply as ‘coronavirus’, who when infecting humans causes the 
disease that has been named ‘COVID-19’. Its diffusion started in the Chinese province 
of Huabei –its main focus being the city of Wuhan– and it quickly spread to the whole 
world. For observers and analysts based in Europe, the coronavirus became more real 
when the first cases of infection were diagnosed in Italy, in February 2020. Its reach 
became so broad, that on 11 March 2020 the World Health Organization declared it a 
pandemic, and nowadays it is considered a major threat for global health. According 
to WHO official data, by 30 March 2020, world-wide there are more than 600,000 con-
firmed cases, over 30,000 deaths and more than 200 countries, areas or territories with 
confirmed cases of infection.
There are few things as representative of the natural realm as a virus. If one accepts 
the contested analytical distinction between ‘nature’ and ‘culture’ (Descola 2005; Ko-
schorke 2009), a virus such as the novel coronavirus clearly belongs to the domain of 
the former. Nevertheless, despite its biological nature, it also impacts strongly the 
socio-cultural dimension: when perceived –and interpreted– as a threat, it generates 
individual and collective feelings such as fear and panic, gives place to the implemen-
tation of political measures that has frozen the economy of several countries, and 
leads to controversial decisions that limit civil rights such as freedom of movement 
and of association. All these are socio-cultural effects that have been caused by the 
perception, interpretation, and ‘reading’ that humans make of the virus, which as a 
result becomes a threat. Departing from this general premise, the overarching goal of 
this article is to discuss the dynamics of this sort of effects of the coronavirus and the 
resulting disease –COVID-19– on the socio-cultural dimension. As these are many 
and of diverse nature, the focus will be set on a specific issue: the discursive dimen-
sion associated to the dynamics of collective blame-attribution in the context of the 
COVID-19 pandemic. 
Assuming that a virus is spread –even if it is involuntarily– by individual actors 
by becoming part of a chain of contagion, the case of COVID-19 has shown in a clear 
manner how in a context of a situation of collective fear, specific discourses emerge 
regarding blame-attribution. These discourses open the field regarding what blaming 
someone means. In this context, as it proves difficult to identify individual actors to 
put the blame on (‘Who brought the virus to country X?’, ‘Who infected individu-
al Y?’), collective actors have been constructed in order to make blame-attribution 
possible. Due to the semiotic mechanisms involved in this process, specific tags have 
been linked to these sort of ‘imagined communities’ (Anderson 1983), which have 
been used as escape goats to relief the feeling of impotence linked to the fear caused 
by the abnormal situation linked to the outbreak. At the beginning, when the spread 
of the novel coronavirus was still regarded by the WHO as an epidemic, the collective 
actor ‘the Chinese’ was blamed for the origin of the virus due to their gastronomic 
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customs, which were usually judged as unhealthy and primitive. When in February 
2020 the virus became highly visible in Italy, in some European countries a narrative 
emerged blaming ‘the Italians’ for the spread of the virus, pointing out to their al-
legedly reckless manners and ‘Southern’ lifestyle. In some Latin American countries 
such as Uruguay and Argentina, where the first infected cases date from mid-March 
2020, the collective identity ‘the posh’ (‘los chetos’, in the local degrading slang termi-
nology) has been identified as the social actor to be blamed, as they are the ones who 
can afford travelling to places where the virus is spread and, as a result, import the 
virus into their own countries on their return. Last but not least, nowadays there is an 
ever-growing discourse that stigmatizes the collective actor of ‘the irresponsible’ that 
do not stay home, its most visible case being the spring-breakers in the United States 
(Bella 2020; The Guardian 2020a).
To sum up, within the context of the COVID-19 outbreak, several Others have been 
constructed in discourse in order to articulate a –narrative– explanation for the spread 
of the virus. As it normally happens in every narrative emplotment, it seems to be the 
case that there needs to be a sort of villain, i.e., an actor with agency –and hence with 
the capability of making moral choices– to be blamed for the circumstances. If percep-
tion is mediated by the principle of narrativity –understood not as “a particular type 
of discourse, but as a deep structure that can be found in every discourse” (Paolucci 
2012:299)–, then it is understandable that facts are integrated into narrative articu-
lations –stories, social discourses, imaginaries– in which specific actors fulfill specific 
thematic roles. This article examines from a sociosemiotic perspective such mecha-
nisms of discursive construction of the Other as a central instance in the dynamics of 
blame-attribution in the context of the COVID-19 outbreak. In what follows, the first 
section introduces the research field of sociosemiotics, the second discusses fear as an 
emotion that is socially constructed, the third examines identity from a constructivist 
perspective as the result of the establishment of differences following an imagined 
distinction between the collective actors of ‘we’ and ‘they’, and the fourth and final 
focuses on the mechanisms of collective identity construction and blame-attribution 
in the context of the COVID-19 outbreak. 
SOCIOSEMIOTICS: THE STUDY OF ‘MEANING IN ACTION’
Semiotics was first conceived as a discipline by Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure, 
who in his Cours de linguistique générale, published in 1916, presented it as the sill 
inexistent science whose interest would be set on studying the life of signs in the 
framework of social life, and hence a sub-discipline of social psychology. Departing 
from this general idea, during the 20th century semiotics grew as an autonomous re-
search field, even if it never managed to break completely its link with linguistics and 
philosophy of language: authors such as Roland Barthes, Charles Sanders Peirce, Al-
girdas Greimas and Umberto Eco, who nowadays are regarded as ‘fully-fledged’ semi-
oticians, started their intellectual careers by studying language. This link gave place 
to a conceptualization that persisted for years of semiotics as the science that studies 
signs and sign systems (Hénault 2012; Landowski 2019), leading to its categorization 
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by many as “abstract and removed from the way the world actually works” (Lorusso 
2015:2). 
In spite of this original focus on signs and sign systems, during the last decades 
there has been a methodological turn within the discipline: researchers have shifted 
their focus of interest from specific manifestations of language in the form of standard 
verbal and audiovisual texts to a broader spectrum of phenomena, such as practices, 
interactions, trajectories, and situations, amongst many others, by using the analyt-
ical category of ‘text’ as a model of analysis (Landowski 2014; Marrone 2011). Re-
searchers such as Jean-Marie Floch (1990), Jacques Fontanille (2008), Eric Landowski 
(2014), Patrizia Violi (2014), and Gianfranco Marrone (2001), to mention only a few 
of well-known names within the discipline, started applying the concepts, theories 
and methods of traditional semiotic theory to the study of ‘meaning in action’, i.e., 
the signifying processes that take place within –and that at the same time, construct 
and reproduce– the social realm (Hénault 2012; Landowski 2014; Landowski 2019; 
Lorusso 2015). As Floch (1990:22) argues in a book that nowadays is a reference of 
applied semiotics, the discipline can be defined by considering its field of research: 
“languages –all languages– and signifying practices, which essentially are social prac-
tices”, making its scholarly aim “the description of the conditions of production and 
understanding of meaning”. This is why, according to Landowski (2014:10), semiotics 
“claims to account for the way how sense emerges from daily life and lived experience 
with its many dimensions”, while Eliseo Verón (1988:125), based on the assumption 
that “every social phenomenon is, in one of its constitutive dimensions, a process 
of meaning-making”, indentifies the scope of the discipline with “the reconstruction 
of the production of meaning within the inter-discursive networks of our societies” 
(Verón 1989:138). Similarly, Anna Maria Lorusso (2015:2) identifies “the processes 
and practices within which meaning, in its multiplicity of languages, exists” as the 
object of study of semiotics.
Independently of the signifier chosen to refer to this research field –‘sociosemiot-
ics’, ‘semiotics of culture’, etc.–, what matters is the agreement regarding the object of 
study. Due to the expansion of its scope, this research field became significantly close 
to other social sciences such as anthropology (Lorusso 2010; Landowski 2016). Within 
anthropology, the work of Clifford Geertz (1973) presents significant commonalities 
with the sociosemiotic approach. Geertz (1973:4) is broadly known for his semiotic ac-
count according to which “culture consists of socially established structures of mean-
ing in terms of which people do […] things as signal”. More generally, he writes:
Believing […] that man is an animal suspended in webs of significance he himself 
has spun, I take culture to be those webs, and the analysis of it to be therefore 
not an experimental science in search of law but an interpretative one in search 
of meaning. (Geertz 1973:5)
For Geertz (1973:11), culture can be read and interpreted as a text, given that cul-
tural practices –such as cockfights in Bali, which he famously studied–, and human 
behavior in general, are seen as “symbolic action –action which, like phonation in 
speech, pigment in painting, line in writing, or sonance in music, signifies”. Hence, 
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Geertz supports an interpretative approach to culture based on conceiving it as a com-
plex text that needs to be decoded by employing the method of ‘thick description’, 
aimed at “gaining access to the conceptual world in which our subjects live so that 
we can, in some extended sense of the term, converse with them” (1973:23). This ap-
proach seems to be in line, just to mention an example, with what Susan Sontag tried 
to do in her book Illness as Metaphor (1978), where she examined the metaphors asso-
ciated to diseases such as tuberculosis and cancer with the aim of demystifying them. 
In other words, the aim of cultural analysis can be conceived as “sorting out the struc-
tures of signification […] and determining their social ground and import” (Geertz 
1973:10). Similarly, in A Theory of Semiotics Umberto Eco (1976) made the effort of 
formulating a general theory of semiotics that could study any signifying phenome-
non based on sign-functions. According to Eco (1976:22), “humanity and society exist 
only when communicative and significative relationships are established”, what leads 
him to formulate a methodological premise according to which “the whole of culture 
should be studied as a communicative phenomenon based on signification systems”. 
This premise is also underlying the work of Verón (1988:125), who believed that “ev-
ery form of social organization, every system of action, every set of social relations, 
implies, in its own definition, a signifying dimension”. That is why, according to Verón 
(1988:126), “meaning is interlinked in an inextricable manner with social behaviour”, 
and meaning-making is to be considered as the basis for “the material organization of 
society, its institutions and its social relations”. 
To sum up, the focus of scholars researching the socio-cultural dimension from 
a semiotic perspective is set on how meaning emerges, circulates, and is consumed 
within the webs of inter-subjectivity that constitute ‘culture’, which is characterized 
by permanent and complex processes of semiosis, that is, of emergence of signifying 
functions. As Verón argues (1988:126), “it is in semiosis that the reality of the social 
is constructed”, while Lorusso (2015:3) conceives semiosis as “a social institution”. It 
is because of this focus that, as Lorusso (2015:2) argues, “semiotics can ‘match’ with 
other scientific paradigms”, based on the fact that it shares with them “assumptions, 
practices, and authors of reference”.
FEAR AS A SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION
Underlying the sociosemiotic outlook is a constructivist premise according to which 
social reality is constructed by means of specific processes of interpretation and mean-
ing-attribution. As a theoretical account, constructivism has gained strength during 
the last decades in several social sciences and the humanities, affecting discussions 
within sociology (Berger and Luckmann 1966), social psychology (Gergen 1999), in-
ternational relations (Wendt 1992) and philosophy (Searle 1995). In spite of the many 
existing constructivist accounts, the basic premise of constructivism is the denial of 
realism and of other essentialist accounts that consider reality as something given 
and pre-social; for constructivists, reality itself is a social construction based on inter-
subjective agreement in which language helps to construct, maintain and reproduce 
that reality.
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In line with this general tenet, during the last couple of decades several semioticians 
studied social and collective phenomena such as memory, trauma and conflict from a 
semiotic perspective, paying attention at how specific cognitive and emotional pro-
cesses take place in the form of dynamics of semiosis. In this general context, emotions 
such as fear and panic are understood as social constructions based on intersubjective 
processes of meaning-making, both on the individual and the collective level. Regard-
ing the individual level, Hutchinson and Bleiker (2014:505) argue that “what people 
feel physiologically as emotions is the product of social and cultural encounters and 
of how individuals have been socialized into managing their emotions through and 
within such encounters”. That is why, even if it is true that the emotions an individual 
feels have a bodily anchorage, these are not innate or natural: emotions should be 
conceived as ‘cultural products’, because “feelings are formed and structured within 
particular social and cultural environments” (Hutchinson and Bleiker 2014:504). As 
the authors argue, “to experience feelings such as anger, fear, trust, or empathy is 
dependent on a specific cultural context that renders such emotions meaningful and 
acceptable”. 
The same principle applies for the collective dimension of fear and panic. Members 
of a society feel these emotions in their bodies when there is a dominant discourse 
that constructs a threat in narrative terms. In the achievement of such a perception, 
there are semiotic mechanisms involved: on the one hand, the cognitive, which is re-
lated to a specific perception of reality and facts based on an articulated set of norma-
tive and evaluative parameters (e.g. ‘COVID-19 is a threat for my/our well-being’); and 
on the other hand, the affective, which is triggered by the cognitive process and refers 
to the actual emotions that the interpretation of facts produces on the individuals. In 
the transition from the former to the latter, semiosis plays a central role, given that 
it is the “signifying dimension of social phenomena” (Verón 1988:125) and, as such, 
articulates perception and emotions in a narrative manner, departing from the dom-
inant semiotic premise according to which “narrativity is the form of meaning that 
structures thought” (Paolucci 2012:303). 
Taking this framework to the case of the COVID-19 outbreak, the virus itself would 
not be considered a major global threat without a discursive environment that trans-
forms every confirmed infection or death in an actualization of that mainstream narra-
tive: infections and deaths trigger specific interpretative processes, both at the individ-
ual and collective level, that support the confirmation of the interpretative hypothesis 
‘COVID-19 is a threat’. Such a discursive environment is fostered inter-subjectively, 
for example by interpersonal conversations, official declarations of government and 
experts, viral content and memes shared on social media, and media coverage. In this 
environment, an objective fact (‘a new virus is infecting a high number of people in a 
very short period of time’) becomes a threat because specific meanings are attributed 
to it based on a broader narrative that serves as the interpretative framework. Fear and 
panic are, hence, the product of social discourse and, as Verón (1988:126) argues, “a 
sociosemiotics can only be a theory of the production of social discourses”.
When analyzing phenomena such as the COVID-19 outbreak from a sociosemiot-
ic perspective, it is essential to keep in mind that fear is socially constructed, and 
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therefore the object of research should be social discourse, with a specific focus on its 
narrative dimension, i.e., who are the actors involved in the narrative, which is their 
relationship, what is the ‘object of value’ that is being disputed, and which is the logic 
of the interactions between the actors in order to gain access to that object. Within 
this conceptualization, based on the principle that assumes that narrativity is “the 
semiotic form capable of rendering thought meaningful” (Paolucci 2012:304), threats 
take a narrative form, including the construction of an actor that is responsible of 
that threat (Cosenza 2018). As Helger Mölder (2011:34) argues, a “culture of fear in-
creases the role of instability and anxiety in social discourses and relationships and 
makes distinctions between friendly Us and hostile Others”. As a result, a specific type 
of discourse is permanently constructed by means of textual and narrative articula-
tions, where collective actors such as ‘We, humanity’ and ‘It, the virus’ are not only 
constructed, but also axiologized positively and negatively, as we shall see in the next 
section.
IDENTITY AND THE ‘WE’/’THEY’ DICHOTOMY
Identities, both individual and collective, do not escape the logic of meaning-making 
based on a narrative articulation discussed above: they are inter-subjective co-con-
structions based on a negotiation of meaning articulated around the principle of rec-
ognition. This means that an identity only exists if there is an interpreter who rec-
ognizes it as such. As a result, from a constructivist perspective identities cannot be 
defined in an essentialist manner, i.e., based on fix, stable and given sets of proper-
ties; instead, they are defined from a relational perspective, which identifies them as 
meaningful units by means of the establishment of differences with other identities. 
That is why Leonor Arfuch (2005) believes that identities are ‘relational positions’. 
Such a theoretical premise can be found, for example, in the sociolinguistic research 
of Bucholtz and Hall (2005:585-586), who argue that identities are “a relational and 
socio-cultural phenomenon that emerges and circulates in local discourse contexts of 
interaction rather than as a stable structure located primarily in the individual psyche 
or in fixed social categories”. Identities, both individual and collective, are construct-
ed by means of cognitive processes linked to articulations of meaning based on a nar-
rative principle. 
When dealing with collective identities, the discursive construction of the mul-
tiple meaningful units and categories that are part of the narrative –for example, in 
the case of national identity, ‘the Polish’, ‘the Uruguayans’, and so on– takes place by 
establishing an imaginary dichotomy between a ‘We’ and a ‘They’. Both actors result 
from a semiotic mechanism in which reality is segmented arbitrarily in groups that are 
imagined not only as different, but homogeneous and monolithic as well. This phe-
nomenon has been studied in detail, amongst others, in the political realm (Mouffe 
2005; Cosenza 2018) and in the context of nationalism studies (Anderson 1983). The 
premise is that, if there is a ‘We’, imagined as unitary and homogeneous, it is because 
there has been a discursive construction of an Other, relationally defined as ‘non-We’, 
which is also imagined as unitary and homogeneous. As Fornäs (2012:43) argues when 
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studying the idea of a ‘European’ identity, “identities are formed by signification pro-
cesses spun around specific individuals or groups, where people in thought and action 
link somebody or something to a range of meanings representing characteristic traits 
and values for that person or collective”. This process of meaning-making implies a 
number of cognitive mechanisms whose core is semiotic, that is, related to semiosis, 
such as actorialization, generalization and axiologization.
Actorialization can be defined as the construction of collective actors on the discur-
sive dimension. This implies the definition of a collective identity based on the estab-
lishment of arbitrary boundaries that separate ‘units of meaning’. As Eco (1976:73) 
showed in A Theory of Semiotics based on the research of linguist Louis Hjelmlev, 
meaning is to be conceived not referentially, but as ‘cultural unit’ that is “placed in 
a system of other cultural units which are opposed to it and circumscribe it”; there-
fore, Eco argues (1976:66), “every attempt to establish what the referent of a sign is 
forces us to define the referent in terms of an abstract entity which moreover is only 
a cultural convention”. Every narrative configuration implies some actors, which are 
discursively constructed. In the case of the COVID-19 outbreak, a number of actors 
have been constructed in discourse. On the side of the heroes, ‘the workers of the 
health system’, an imagined actor whose members are unknown from an individual 
perspective and whose bravery is in several countries recognized on a daily basis with 
a collective round of applause. But on the other side, as it was mentioned in the Intro-
duction, a number of Others have been constructed: ‘the Chinese’, ‘the Italians’, ‘the 
posh’, and ‘the irresponsible’, amongst others. Even if they might have an anchorage 
on factual events, these ‘cultural units of meaning’ that have been arbitrarily delim-
ited, fulfill a cognitive function: if the unit of meaning ‘the Chinese’ occupies a role in 
the mainstream narrative articulated around the COVID-19 outbreak, then specific 
attributes and connotations will be attributed following a deductive logic to individ-
ual actors that are recognized as members of that group, leading to xenophobic and 
racists judgments. Besides the arbitrary segmentation, there is a process of generaliza-
tion, in which the specific individual units that are imagined as part of the collective 
actor are assumed to be the same or, at least, share their core properties. Collective 
actors, then, in their quality of being discursive constructions based on the attribution 
of a homogeneous identity to an imagined group, gain life as opposed to other actors, 
also imagined, based on the dichotomy anchored on the pronouns ‘We’ and ‘They’.
When dealing with collective identities, however, the most interesting semiotic 
mechanism involved in the social construction of the Other is axiologization, which 
consists in the attribution of specific value and normative connotations to the collec-
tive actors that have been created in discourse. Following Anne Hénault (2012:275), 
axiologization can be defined as “the static valorization of a given universe of dis-
course”, what implies a normative and value-loaded dimension that adds positive and/
or negative marks to the units of meaning that have been arbitrarily delimited, includ-
ing the collective identities that are of our interest. Chantal Mouffe (2005:5) iden-
tified that the ‘We’/’They’ dichotomy that structures the field of political discourse, 
axiologization takes place on a moral register: as she argues, “the we/they, instead of 
being defined with political categories, is now established in moral terms” following 
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a narrative of a struggle between ‘right’ and ‘wrong’, what produces a transformation 
in the conception of the political opponent from an adversary to an enemy. It is in this 
way that, in the field of politics, the Other gains specific negative marks and connota-
tions, which sometimes represent a major obstacle for dialogue and rational political 
struggle.
ACTORIALIZATION AND BLAME-ATTRIBUTION IN THE CONTEXT OF THE 
COVID-19 OUTBREAKE
This section will focus on two major issues: on the one hand, the discursive construc-
tion of the multiple Others in the case of the COVID-19 outbreak; and on the other, 
the role these discursive constructions might play in a narrative scheme of blame-at-
tribution.
Regarding the former, based on the theoretical framework discussed in the previous 
pages, some specific collective actors have been not only constructed based on the 
mechanisms of actorialization and generalization, but they have also been strongly 
axiologized and regularly used as ‘escape goats’ to explain the threat that the virus 
poses in narrative terms. As Argentinean journalist Verónica Abdala (2020) discuss-
es in a very recent piece, the fact that the virus was originated in the Chinese city 
of Wuhan has produced a surge of xenophobic and racist attitudes, in the form of 
“a rejection in the whole world towards restaurants and shops managed by Chinese 
citizens, besides discriminatory and racist episodes towards individuals with Asian 
features”. This phenomenon is also reported by Laurie Chen (2020a; 2020b), who in a 
coverage of the awareness-raising action staged in Florence by Massimiliano Marti-
gli Jiang –an Italian-Chinese individual– writes that “as in other Western countries, 
there has been a surge in xenophobic incidents targeting Chinese people in Italy in 
the wake of the deadly coronavirus outbreak”. For Suyin Haynes (2020), this wave of 
discrimination “is not only targeting mainland Chinese people, but people of east and 
south east Asian descent more broadly, including those who are not first-generation 
immigrants”. Moreover, in a recent piece, Becky Little (2020) identifies in the 
United States a historical record characterized by a “biased way of associating 
immigrants with disease”.
The use of the unit of meaning ‘the Chinese’ –an imagined collective actor 
that is constructed discursively and hence arbitrarily– in the narrative that at-
tributes blame for the spread of the COVID-19 has been fueled by allegations 
done by political actors on China’s –the state, represented by its government– 
responsibility in the outbreak, like for example Donald Trump’s reference to the 
virus as the ‘Chinese virus’, a denomination that has been strongly criticized, 
especially after a photograph of his speaking points in which the original phrase 
‘corona virus’ was manually replaced by ‘Chinese virus’ circulated online. More-
over, there are reports that indicate that political actors close to Trump used 
the expression ‘Kung Flu’ to refer to the virus (Orbey 2020; Rogers, Jakes, and 
Swanson 2020), and it has been reported that Republican Senator John Cornyn 
declared that “China is to blame, because the culture where people eat bats and 
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snakes and dogs and things like that […]” (Orbey 2020), a statement that takes 
the discursive construction to a cultural level, beyond the political dimension. As 
Eren Orbey (2020) argues, “the terror of Trump’s finger-pointing is not only that it will 
surely exacerbate the misdirected anger and violence against Asians and Asian-Amer-
icans; it’s that his jingoism undermines the collective effort that’s essential to slowing 
the virus’s spread”.
In short, in reference to the case of China as a state, China as a cultural unit and ‘the 
Chinese’, it can be clearly seen how the three units of meaning tend to merge into one, 
given that the signifier ‘China’, besides referring to a country –an administrative unit 
with clear boundaries, sovereignty and a government that can be held accountable for 
its actions–, also refers to another clusters of meaning, linked to the collective identity 
of ‘the Chinese’, whose boundaries and defining properties are not so well-established 
as in the case of the political unit: to blame ‘the Chinese’ for the spread of the virus 
represents an oversimplification that is handy when trying to emplot and explain facts 
in narrative terms, but that is not accurate. Nevertheless, for many it is still a key piece 
in the narrative explanation of the current extraordinary circumstances. In opposi-
tion, some counter-narratives also have emerged, such as the one condensed in the 
#JeNeSuisPasUnVirus hashtag that has been promoted in France by the French-Asian 
community as a form of denouncing discrimination (Chen 2020a).
A second case of interest can be found in the situation that took place in countries 
such as Argentina and Uruguay, where the virus was imported to these countries by 
travelers arriving from Europe. As Abdala (2020) points out, in Argentina the spread 
of COVID-19 was initially associated to a specific social class, what also happened in 
Uruguay, where one of the first confirmed cases of infected individuals –on 13 March 
2020– was a fashion designer who in early March arrived to the country from Spain 
and, instead of putting herself in a preventive self-quarantine, the night of her arrival 
attended a massive wedding (The Guardian 2020). Her identity, as well as humoristic 
–and at the same time stigmatizing– viral content quickly spread on social media, in-
cluding some voice messages from individuals clearly recognizable due to their tone 
and language as being part of the imagined collective actor of ‘the posh’. This fueled 
very quickly the hypothesis that the COVID-19 had been introduced in Uruguay by 
‘the posh’, a collective identity that in Uruguayan social discourse is linked to Carras-
co, a residential neighborhood in the capital city Montevideo. In a context of strong 
political polarization articulated in the form of class-belonging attributed to a hege-
monic political discourse associated to left-wing political actors, this single occur-
rence became an actualization of the interpretative narrative that blames ‘the posh’.
Having discussed some of the examples of how collective actors are imagined and 
constructed in discourse by means of specific semiotic mechanisms, a brief discussion 
of the process of blame-attribution will follow, with the aim of understanding why 
collective actors as the ones discussed above need to be created –and axiologized– in 
order to consolidate the narrative on the spread of the COVID-19. This will be done 
based on philosopher Thomas Scanlon’s (2008; 2013) account, who conceives blame 
as “a class of responses to morally faulty actions” that implies “a modification of one’s 
understanding of one’s relationship with the person blamed”, particularly of the ex-
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pectations towards them (Scanlon 2013:84-86). The concept of relationship plays a 
central role in Scanlon’s account, as blaming someone implies modifying the relation-
ship one has with them. For Scanlon (2013:84), a relationship is “a set of intentions 
and expectations about our actions and attitudes toward one another that are justified 
by certain facts about us”. This account can be easily applied to the case of interper-
sonal relations such as friendship and family, but what happens in cases such as the 
one that is of interest in this article, in which actors are not individuals, but collective 
identities?
To cover these impersonal situations –that is, situations in which one cannot know 
the person that is to be blamed for an action–, Scanlon introduces the idea of the 
‘moral relationship’, which according to the author is universal, inescapable and holds 
among all rational agents. As Scanlon (2013:87) argues, “the moral relationship does 
not apply only to people who know of or are acquainted with one another or who ac-
tually have certain attitudes towards one another”: it is a normative relationship that 
we all stand in with all the other individuals, which establishes that “we should have 
certain general intentions about how we will behave toward other rational creatures” 
(2013:87), even if we do not know them. It is based on the idea of this moral relation-
ship that Scanlon builds his account of blame: “blame and blameworthiness […] are 
always relative to some relationship or relationships” (2013:88), what makes holding 
a relationship a precondition for blame-attribution to take place: if there is no rela-
tionship, there simply cannot be blame-attribution. It is here where the principle of 
narrativity that articulates cognition can be of help.
From a semiotic perspective, it could be argued that in impersonal cases, i.e., in cas-
es in which one cannot identify a specific individual or social actor to blame, the pro-
cess of blame-attribution based on the moral relationship gives place to a process of 
imagination and discursive construction in narrative terms of the agent to be blamed. 
For blame-attribution to take place, such construction is a necessary condition. In the 
case of interpersonal relations, one can always attribute responsibility to someone’s 
actions that are prejudicial to one in a narrative manner, such as, for example, in the 
case in which a friend or relative that does not want to self-confine him/herself and 
that, as a result of that action, infect us with the virus. But in the case of impersonal 
relations –which are the dominant case in the context of the COVID-19 outbreak, 
given that asymptomatic contagion is possible–, the actor to be blamed needs to be 
discursively constructed, so that the blame can be put on them following the articu-
lating narrative principle in which an agent acts morally wrong and therefore can be 
blamed. In other words: in a context in which it is difficult to find individual escape 
goats to blame for infecting others, it is simpler to construct discursive actors and 
held them responsible for the catastrophe. In this sense, the discursive construction 
of the Other seems to be a clear confirmation of the cognitive hypothesis regarding 
the central role of narrativity in the articulation of perception: to make sense of the 
abnormal circumstances, someone needs to be blamed, because narrativity implies 
causality and agency.
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CONCLUDING REMARKS
This article should serve not only as a proof to show the actuality of sociosemiotic 
thinking nowadays, but also as a way of bringing into attention the relevance that 
social discourses and the principle of narrativity play in how individuals and other 
social actors perceive reality. In times of confusion, fear and even social chaos, iden-
tifying the social discourses that structure the debate will certainly help to deal with 
uncertainty in a more accurate way. Moreover, the reflections presented in the previ-
ous pages should be put in perspective with regards to a challenging paradox that is 
anchored in the nature of the virus, who does not recognize the identities, arbitrarily 
established, that structure human perception such as nationality or social class. 
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